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- MP pour éventuelle utilisation en publications

- PS. pour connaissance finale et transmission (confidentielle) à Washington.

EC / US RELATIONS

I enclose for your information a small dossier describing the current situation of EC-US trade relations as at 22nd of June 1982.

EP → AJ → Th. Hutchinson (à faire après)

- à toi avec bcp.
- de la même vie confidentielle suffisante se connaît, mais distincte
  pourrais me voir entrer à titre personnel chez le bureau pour leur information de "background" car ce thème me paraît relever de l'intérêt de tous.

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I B 1

EC - U.S. RELATIONS

1. General situation

1.1. The current difficult phase in relations between the U.S. and the Community shows no signs of easing. Divergencies in both political and economic philosophy remain unresolved and compromise solutions are both difficult to negotiate and fragile when found, whether in economic and commercial questions directly in the Community's responsibility (such as agricultural trade disputes and the steel complaints) or in those of a broader political character with indirect effects (defence policy, relations with Latin America or relations with the Eastern Block).

1.2. Aside from difficulties and pressures arising from the ongoing recession, a great part of the tensions in the commercial sector appear to be a result of the rigid ideological stance of the Administration of President Reagan. Its domestic policy of reduction of government engagement in the economy and for the liberation of market forces, translates in external policy into an insistance on "free and fair trade" and opposition to subsidies or aids by foreign governments.

The present budgetary difficulties in Congress, with the close prospect of Congressional elections, accentuate the Administration's search for further acceptable cuts in spending, inter alia in subsidies and therefore - to make them palatable domestically - inevitably to a hardening of its demands on its commercial partners.

The overall feeling of the Administration is that the Subsidy Code in GATT is not strong enough. While it realises that formal renegotiation is out of the question, it is endeavouring through a series of pointed actions to obtain interpretations of the Code as closely as possible in conformity with its position. Such an overriding preoccupation is manifest in the majority of the current acute trade problems between the Community and the U.S. : steel, countervailing duty procedure, agricultural GATT actions and the export credits disputes (minimum rates and the countervailability of consensus rates.)

1.3. Although complete figures are not yet available, indications are that the overall balance of trade in 1981 of the Community has improved by comparison with the huge deficit of $65.6 milliards experienced in 1980 (Table I attached). By contrast, that of the U.S. deteriorated to about $39.8 milliards from $37.1 milliards. An important part of this development, from both points of view, was a decrease in the bilateral deficit between the Community and the U.S. Again, figures are not complete, but the provisional estimate is that the deficit will be about $14 milliards, down from $25 milliards.

It is clear that the principal reasons underlying this development are firstly the strength of the dollar whose value rose from its low point of 0.69 ECU in July 1980 to 0.97 ECU in August 1981 and has since remained at levels above 0.91 ECU; and secondly, the continuing weakness [illegible]. These combined influences have led to a reduction in the total value of imports from the U.S. of [illegible] while EC exports have performed reasonably well to give an increase of $4 milliards (see Table II).

2. Principal Commercial Problems

There are three principal areas in which commercial problems arise : steel, agriculture and East-West trade.

2.1. Steel

Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy complaints by the U.S. industry threaten Community exports of some 4 million tons of steel worth over $2 milliards. On 11 June, the Department of Commerce published its preliminary finding on the existence of subsidies in the affirmative. EC exports of the steel products concerned now become liable to countervailing duties at rates up to 40% for British Steel Corporation, 30% for Sacilor (France) and 20% for Usinor (France) and Cockerill-Sambre (Belgium). Efforts by the Commission to find a compromise solution which could avoid a complete block of EC exports have so far been unsuccessful. (See Annex I).

2.2. Agriculture

As noted above, the Reagan Administration has set its face sternly against all forms of subsidy. The U.S. feels itself strongly affected by Community exports, in its view aided by restitutions, to third markets. The Community insists that its restitutions are fully compatible with its GATT obligations since they are not used to obtaining an inequitable share of the world market, and in that they do not cause prejudice to American producers. It is the Community's view that it cannot deny to its own agriculturists a share of a rapidly growing world market. (See Annex II).

2.3. East-West Trade

Significant differences of view continue to separate the EC and the U.S. on this subject. This can be explained by the far greater significance of East-West trade for the EC (8% of two-way trade) than for the U.S. (2%), on the one hand, and by a different assessment of measures to be taken against the USSR and Eastern Europe on the other hand. This has led to some frictions, for example, in the respective attitudes to trade with the USSR (following the Afghanistan and Polish episodes), and on the extension of credits to the USSR. The 18 June 1982 decision of President Reagan to extend the December 1981 sanctions on the export of oil and gas equipment to the USSR - through the adoption of new regulations to include equipment produced by subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad as well as equipment produced under licences issued by U.S. companies - adds considerably to already existing tensions.

Apart from creating new difficulties in relations between Member States and Eastern Europe, this decision might be particularly harmful to the commercial interests of numerous EC companies, as well as to Member States' medium and longer term gas supplies. Moreover, it raises the problem of the extraterritorial applicability of U.S. law and is contrary to declarations made at the Versailles Summit (Annex III).

2.4. DISC (Domestic International Sales Corporations)

The United States action on alleged subsidies to Community steel exports to the United States could lead the Community to consider the United States system of DISC (whereby domestic subsidiaries of a wide range of United States firms are in effect deferring for an indefinite period of

time payment of part of U.S. corporate taxes on export income). The Gatt has found that this practice, which costs the U.S. Treasury approaching one billion dollars a year, must be regarded as an export subsidy. The Commission will therefore prepare proposals for consideration by the Council as to the action which the Community might take under the GATT rules (see Annex IV).

2.5. Export Credits

This presents two aspects; on the one hand, there is some difference over the minimum rates to be established in the "Consensus" of the OECD; on the other, there has arisen the question as to whether credits granted via government agencies, within the limits of the consensus agreement are countervailable under the GATT Subsidy Code (see Annex V).

2.6. Economic Policy

The Administration's 'tight money' policy has had together with the budget deficits of both of the Federal and State Governments, the effects of maintaining interest rates at very high levels, and of raising the value of the dollar. This has had international repercussions, in placing constraints on the policy choices of trading partners, not least EC Member States, and the dollar exchange rates inter alia in the purchase price of petroleum which is nominated in dollars.

During the Versailles Summit, certain undertakings were made (on U.S. interventions to control the exchange rate). It is to be hoped that the implementation of these will gradually ease the problem.

2.7. Others

Contained in the annexes are notes on some other specific points in EC-U.S. relations viz :

- Government Procurement Code
- Application of Community law to Multinationals
- Energy Policy
- Section 337, Tariff Act 1930
- Tariff re-classification
- Shipping
- Unitary Taxation
- Copyright Act 1978
- Reciprocity
- Tables on EC balance of trade.

ANNEXE 1

ACIER

Plus des deux tiers des exportations communautaires d'acier vers les Etats-Unis - un poste important (près de 3 mrds de dollars) de la balance commerciale déjà largement déficitaire de la CE - est l'objet d'enquêtes anti-dumping et anti-subvention.

D'emblée la Communauté a contesté le bien fondé des accusations lancées contre elle par l'industrie américaine. Les aides étroitement contrôlées accordées à notre industrie ont pour objet la restructuration et la réduction des capacités de production et ne peuvent, pour cette raison, être considérées comme des subventions au titre du GATT. En outre, avec une part du marché américain de 6 %, nous ne pouvons être tenus pour responsables des problèmes de l'industrie sidérurgique américaine, problèmes imputables à la récession.

Le Département du Commerce a déterminé, à titre préliminaire, le 10 juin que les exportations communautaires en cause bénéficiaient de subventions. Les taux de subventions constatés vont de 40 % pour British Steel Corporation, 30 à 20 % pour les sidérurgistes français, 18,3 % pour la sidérurgie italienne, à des montants faibles ou négligeables pour les sidérurgie allemande - dont certaines entreprises sont complètement mises hors de cause -, luxembourgeoise et néerlandaise.

Ces enquêtes ne peuvent être réduites à un banal litige commercial entre producteurs qu'il conviendrait de trancher au seul regard des règles de la législation américaine en la matière. Les conséquences commerciales directes qu'elles pourraient avoir pour la Communauté sont considérables (perte immédiate de près d'un milliard de commerce). Mais leur enjeu va bien au-delà :

- d'abord ces enquêtes mettent en cause des programmes destinés à permettre et à accélérer la restructuration et la réduction des capacités de l'industrie européenne.

- Les décisions du DOC soulèvent de graves questions de principe concernant l'interprétation du concept de subvention et le calcul du montant de la subvention. Elles comportent à cet égard des innovations dont les implications considérables dépassent largement le seul secteur de l'acier. Les décisions unilatérales et extrêmes du DOC sont inacceptables pour la CE qui les contestera devant le Comité du Code sur les subventions (15 juillet). Elles font peser une lourde menace sur le fonctionnement du Code sur les Subventions, l'un des acquis exxentiels du Tokyo Round et contribuent à aggraver les tensions qui affectent déjà le système multilatéral des échanges.

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La Communauté, à l'occasion du Conseil des Ministres des 21 et 22 juin, a réagi avec fermeté à ces décisions, indiquant qu'elle les contesterait au GATT, et qu'elle en saisirait également le Comité de l'acier de l'OCDE.

Se référant aux décisions prises lors du Sommet de Versailles concernant les échanges internationaux, notamment en ce qui concerne la prochaine réunion ministérielle du GATT, le Conseil a en outre souligné la nécessité "d'agir au plus haut niveau afin d'engager les discussions constructives qui permettront de dégager des solutions" à ce problème.

ANNEX II

Agriculture

1. This general attitude of the U.S. is clearly reflected in its attitude towards the CAP. While the U.S. Administration wants to cut drastically agricultural support expenditure which has already been declining for several years, it is up in arms against the constantly increasing level of expenditure in the EC.

2. On the one hand, there is an increasing perception in the U.S. that the EC is taking, through subsidisation, a more than equitable share of the international market. Domestic pressure is also building up in the U.S. as evidenced by the filing of Section 301 petitions on sugar, canned fruit and raisins, poultry, pasta and wheat flour.
(see details in annexes A, B, C, D and E).

3. In another case (described in detail in annex F), the United States has challenged the preferential tariff régimes on citrus fruits granted by the Community to Mediterranean producers as contrary to GATT. The Community holds that the agreements are in conformity with its GATT obligations.

4. Moreover, although the U.S. does not officially put into question the basic principles of the CAP, the various declarations made at the highest level seem to show that the objective is to obtain some fundamental changes in the CAP, starting from the level of support prices up to the export policy, i.e. a frontal attack very similar to the one experienced in the beginning of the Tokyo Round. It is in this context that one has to see the strong U.S. reaction to the possibility of installing a tax on vegetable oils.

5. Other concerns of the U.S. with the Community's agricultural policy include :

   (a) the fear that the Community will install a tax on vegetable oils (mentioned above). The U.S. argues that such a tax would influence consumption of soyabean oil, which is imported either in the form of soyabeans for crushing or as pure oil from the U.S., and would therefore be in violation of GATT concessions. Indications are that the U.S. response to such a tax would be sharp.

   (b) the possibility that the EC might take action to unbind the zero duties on corn gluten, dried distillers' grains and other feed ingredients would also risk retaliation. Imports of these goods into the Community from the U.S. have been increasing because of high EC prices. (see details in annex G).

   (c) the possible extension of CAP export policies through long-term bilateral agreements with third countries. The U.S. would consider such a move as unfairly extending Community competition.

S U C R E

1. Suite aux consultations au titre de l'article 12 du Code intervenues le 16 février dernier à l'initiative du Président du Comité des Subventions, les deux parties ont cherché, mais sans y parvenir, une solution satisfaisante au différend qui les oppose, dans le cadre de la procédure de conciliation prévue à l'article 17 § 1 du Code.

2. Les Etats-Unis ont renouvelé leur demande pour un règlement pratique du différend sans toutefois préciser la nature de l'action souhaitée ; cette dernière devrait toutefois mettre un terme au manque à gagner que les producteurs-raffineurs américains subissent, tant sur le marché interne que sur celui d'exportations, en raison de la dépression des prix dont la Communauté serait responsable.

3. La Communauté a rappelé que les producteurs européens sont tout aussi préoccupés de l'état actuel du marché puisqu'ils doivent maintenant financer l'intégralité des restitutions payées pour l'exportation des sucres communautaires. La Communauté a exclu qu'au stade actuel, après la décision qu'elle a prise de stocker 2 mio de tonnes, elle puisse prendre des mesures supplémentaires unilatérales ; toutefois, elle a proposé d'entamer un exercice multilatéral dans le cadre du GATT en vue de remédier à l'ensemble des facteurs affectant les niveaux de prix.

4. Les Etats-Unis n'ont pas pu se prononcer sur cette offre et l'ensemble de la question est actuellement en discussion devant le Comité des Subventions qui examine les possibilités de solution pratique. Des informations récentes indiquent qu'il n'est pas exclu que les Etats-Unis retireraient la plainte.

5. Si ces efforts n'aboutissent pas, les parties, comme le prévoit le § 3 de l'article 17, ont la possibilité, à partir du trentième jour qui suit celui de la demande de conciliation introduite le 6 avril, de demander la constitution d'un "panel".

ANNEX II B

FRUITS EN CONSERVE ET RAISINS SECS

1. Deux réunions de consultations bilatérales se sont tenues avec les Etats-Unis au titre de l'article XXIII § 1 du GATT respectivement les 25 février et le 29 avril 1982. En bref, les arguments avancés de part et d'autre sont les suivants :

2. ETATS-UNIS

Les aides que la Communauté octroie à la production des fruits en conserve (en particulier aux pêches en conserve) sont excessives ; elles stimulent indûment la production communautaire ; elles ont pour effet de réduire les importations en provenance des pays tiers.

En ce qui concerne les raisins secs, l'aide a été introduite le 1er janvier 1981 suite à l'adhésion de la Grèce. Les Américains craignent une chute de leurs exportations vers la Communauté.

3. CEE

Fruits en conserve

L'évolution des importations ne confirme pas les craintes américaines. Depuis l'institution de l'aide en 1978, la Communauté a réduit le montant de l'aide.

Raisins secs

Les difficultés actuelles du marché sont principalement dues à d'autres exportateurs (Turquie) qui offrent des prix extrêmement bas. L'aide introduite le 1er janvier 1981 n'est que l'héritage de l'aide antérieurement concédée par la Grèce à ses producteurs.
La situation concurrentielle pour les Américains n'est pas changée suite à l'adhésion de la Grèce, car déjà les producteurs grecs bénéficiaient de l'aide et, déjà, les raisons secs grecs bénéficiaient de la franchise à l'importation de la Communauté. De plus, les Etats-Unis ont vendu déjà une quantité supérieure à celle de l'année dernière, alors que les exportations (intra et extra) de la Grèce sont très inférieures à la moyenne.

4. Parmi les quatre produits ayant fait l'objet de la consultation pêches et poires en conserve, cocktail de fruits, raisins secs, ce sont ces derniers auxquels les Américains attachent le plus d'importance. La délégation américaine a demandé que la Communauté modifie le régime des aides afin d'éviter toute interférence avec les courants d'exportation des produits concurrents de Californie.

5. Le 17.3.82 les Américains ont demandé l'institution d'un panel au titre de Genève. Selon la législation américaine (Section 301), le terme pour présenter les recommandations au Président Reagan est le 10 août 1982.

ANNEX II C

V O L A I L L E

1. Le 17 septembre 1981 la "National Broilers Council" a déposé une plainte devant le USTR par laquelle elle soutient que les restitutions octroyées par la Communauté violent les articles 8 et 10 du Code antisubventions. Le 28 octobre, le USTR décidait d'ouvrir une enquête et le 13 novembre les autorités américaines demandaient à la Communauté d'entrer en consultation sur la base de l'article 12 § 1 et 3 du Code. La Communauté, estimant que les Etats-Unis n'avaient pas fourni l'élément de "preuve" prévu dans cet article, n'est entrée en consultation avec ces derniers que le 16 février.

2. Les Etats-Unis soutiennent que les restitutions accordées par la Communauté :

- ne sont pas compatibles avec l'article XVI du GATT,
- ont un effet néfaste sur les intérêts américains,
- ont permis aux Dix de prendre plus qu'une part équitable du marché mondial,
- permettent à la Communauté de vendre à des prix sensiblement inférieurs à ceux de la concurrence.

Les Etats-Unis ont aussi demandé d'entrer en consultation au sujet des subsides accordés sur un plan national par la France.

3. Lors des consultations du 16 février 1982, la Communauté a contesté, comme dans le cas farine, la période de référence antérieure prise en considération par les Etats-Unis (1964-66, période pendant laquelle la Communauté n'accordait pas de restitutions).

Les Etats-Unis n'ont pas été en mesure de fournir l'élément de preuve démontrant que la politique communautaire aurait causé un préjudice aux intérêts américains.

La Communauté s'est déclaré prête à poursuivre les consultations mais les Etats-Unis ne se sont pas prononcés sur la suite qu'il y a lieu de réserver à la question.

4. Le délai qu'à le USTR pour présenter les recommandations au Président expire le 28 juin 1982.

[illegible] le 10 juin 1982 les Etats-Unis ont demandé officiellement des [illegible] l'art. 7, § 1, du Code sur les Subventions concernant :

a) le mode de calcul des subventions octroyées par la CE pour la volaille,
b) la politique d'aide nationale de la France.

P A T E S

1. Le 30 novembre dernier, le USTR a accepté une pétition introduite par la National Pasta Association le 16 octobre 1981 au titre de la section 301 du "Trade Act" de 1974. Le USTR devra présenter ses recommandations au Président au plus tard le 30 juin 1982.

2. La N.P.A. et le USTR estiment que pour les pâtes, la Communauté accorde des restitutions à l'exportation d'une façon incompatible avec l'article 9 du Code; celui-ci interdit les subsides à l'exportation pour les produits autres que certains produits primaires.
Les Etats-Unis sont d'avis que le degré de transformation auquel est soumis le blé dur pour produire des pâtes commercialisables est si important qu'il ne permet pas de considérer les pâtes comme un produit primaire. Le 2 décembre ils ont en conséquence demandé des consultations au titre de l'article 12.1.

3. La Communauté ne partage pas l'interprétation américaine de l'article 9; elle octroie, en effet, des restitutions à l'exportation pour les produits agricoles qui sont incorporés dans toute une série de "produits transformés" et si, à la suite d'un panel, ce système devait être jugé incompatible avec les dispositions de l'Accord Général, il devrait être profondément modifié, sinon supprimé, avec des conséquences très graves pour certains courants d'échanges traditionnels et le secteur économique qui les alimente.

4. En raison de ce caractère de "précédent" la Communauté s'est initialement refusée d'entrer en consultation avec les Etats-Unis au titre des dispositions de l'article 12.1 du Code et a demandé la constitution d'un groupe de travail sur l'interprétation de l'article 9.

5. La question a été débattue le 3 et 12 mars et le 7 avril. La Communauté, appuyée par la Finlande, le Pakistan et la Suisse, a soutenu que les possibilités de conciliation n'étaient pas épuisées et qu'il n'était pas opportun de créer d'abord un "groupe spécial", et après un groupe de travail pour interpréter l'article 9 comme le demandaient les Etats-Unis; en effet, les travaux du panel auraient été limités à l'examen des faits et n'auraient pas pu faire avancer la question fondamentale de l'interprétation.

6. Finalement, le président du Comité subventions a suivi les Etats-Unis, appuyés par le Brésil, l'Australie, le Canada, la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Japon. Lors de sa réunion du 29-30 avril, le même Comité s'est mis d'accord sur le mandat, et en principe, la composition du groupe spécial. Entretemps, le Panel a été formellement constitué à partir du 14 juin 1982, sous la présidence de M. METTEL (Ambassadeur d'Autriche). Les travaux débuteront début juillet.

US ACTION ON EEC WHEAT FLOUR EXPORTS

1. In September 1981 the US opened up procedures under the new code on subsidies and countervailing duties concerning EEC wheat flour exports. After initial unsuccessful consultation and conciliation procedures, the question was entrusted to a GATT panel.

2. The complaint which was initially based on Articles 8 and 10 of the subsidies code (more than equitable share of world export trade and price undercutting) has been further complicated by the introduction (after the initial consultation and conciliation stage) of a further request under Article 9 on whether or not wheat flour can be considered a "primary product" (refunds can only be accorded to primary products and a definition for flour as non primary would render export refunds illegal under the GATT).

3. The Panel which first met in February 1982 is composed of Ambassador Suzuki of Japan (Chairman) and Messrs Hobson (Canada) and Lempen (Switzerland). Having met three times and received memoranda from both sides the panel is presently in the process of drawing-up its report.

4. The issues at stake and on which in one way or another the Panel will have to pronounce itself are :

   (a) whether or not Community refunds have led to price undercutting by EEC traders;

   (b) if the refund system has resulted in the EEC acquiring more than an "equitable" share of world flour trade;

   (c) whether or not EEC refunds are a permanent source of uncertainty on the world flour market; and

   (d) if wheat flour can or cannot be considered a "primary product".

5. Under Section 301 USTR must make a recommendation to the President not later than :

   - 7 months after initiation of the investigation in export subsidy cases brought under Article 12.1 of the Code;

   - 8 months after initiation of the investigation in other subsidy cases, including those brought under Article 12.3 of the Code.

On the grounds that USTR decided to treat this case on September 29, 1981 the date for USTR recommendations is May 29, 1982. However, the Panel's final report is not expected before June, and even then the procedure will not be completed because under Article 13 of the code two further stages are envisaged : recommendations from the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures on how the parties might resolve the dispute, and eventually the authorisation of countermeasures if these recommendations are not adhered to.

A G R U M E S

1. Des consultations au titre de l'article XXIII§1 se sont tenues le 20 avril avec les Etats-Unis. L'origine de cette affaire remonte à novembre 1976 où les producteurs d'agrumes américains avaient déposé une plainte au titre de la Section 301 du Trade Act (législation donnant au Président pouvoir de prendre des mesures de rétorsion), alléguant que les accords préférentiels entre la Communauté et certains pays méditerranéens violaient l'article I du GATT, annulaient certaines concessions tarifaires et affectaient défavorablement les exportations américaines d'agrumes vers la CEE. Depuis lors, ce sujet a fait l'objet de discussions et consultations, formelles et informelles, au titre de l'accord Casey/Soames (1) (mars et juillet 1980) et au titre de l'article XXII § 1 du GATT (octobre 1980).

   Après un silence de près d'un an, l'Administration Reagan a brusquement ressorti cette affaire en décembre 1981, indiquant qu'en l'absence de négociations en vue d'une réduction tarifaire, les Etats-Unis porteraient l'affaire au GATT. Interrogés sur le point de savoir si l'Administration mesurait bien les conséquences d'une telle action - qui signifiait la fin de l'accord Casey/Soames - les représentants de l'Administration américaine, venus en janvier à Bruxelles, avaient indiqué que les implications politiques d'une telle décision "had been fully considered".

   Lors de la consultation tenue le 24 avril, les Américains ont encore une fois déclaré qu'à leur avis les préférences tarifaires accordées par la Communauté aux pays méditerranéens sont contraires aux dispositions du GATT et qu'elles annulent des avantages auxquels les Etats-Unis ont droit.

2. Le représentant de la Communauté a averti la délégation américaine que si les Etats-Unis avaient l'intention de demander la constitution d'un "panel" ils auraient dû clairement dénoncer l'arrangement Casey/Soames.

   Il s'agit d'une affaire très délicate et politiquement très sensible pour la Communauté, qui pourrait de plus créer des difficultés importantes pour la bonne tenue de la réunion ministérielle du GATT de l'automne. De l'avis de la Communauté les arrangements préférentiels en faveur des pays méditerranéens sont acceptés par le GATT et sont pleinement conformes aux dispositions de l'article XXIV.

3. Selon les dernières informations, le Gouvernement américain s'apprête à demander la constitution d'un panel sur la politique de la CE dans le domaine des agrumes, sous l'Art. XXIII:2 du GATT. La demande serait introduite au cours de la réunion du Conseil GATT du 29 juin.

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(1) Il est rappelé que l'accord en question est un arrangement officieux et non publié qui a été néanmoins strictement respecté, jusqu'à ce jour par les deux parties. En vertu de cet understanding, la CE acceptait de ne pas étendre ses accords préférentiels à de nouveaux pays et de ne pas solliciter de préférences inverses moyennant l'engagement des Etats-Unis de ne pas contester la légalité de ces accords.

CEREALS SUBSTITUTES : CORN GLUTEN FEED

Background

1. An important element of the Commission's approach on agricultural prices is a policy of gradual realignment of EEC cereals prices with US domestic prices. To make any eventual sacrifices demanded of Community producers more palatable the Commission is proposing that in parallel action be taken on cereal substitute imports. In addition to measures on cereal brans taken in the context of the price package, the Commission's Communication to the Council of 19 April envisages action on manioc and corn gluten feed imports.

2. The proposals regarding manioc - which foresee a limitation on imports through a system of quotas necessitating a bilateral agreement with Thailand and a temporary modification of the GATT binding - have already received an "accord de principe" from the '113 Committee'. The Commission's approach on corn gluten feed (CGF), on the other hand, is more controversial.

3. For CGF the Commission is requesting a mandate to open GATT Art.XXVIII negotiations in order to modify, on a temporary basis, the present GATT binding on CGF. The modification would involve replacing the present duty-free binding with a tariff quota for 3 M tonnes (corresponding to imports in 1981) also duty-free. Imports above the level would be subject to a (dissuasive) levy.

4. In discussions so far in the 113 Committee Member States are divided on the CGF proposal : France, Ireland, Greece and Denmark could broadly accept the Commission's approach, while the other Member States are opposed mainly because of the repercussions such action could have on EEC/US commercial relations. (*)

US reactions to the proposals

5. The Commission expected strong US reaction to its proposals and this has been forthcoming. The Member States individually and collectively as well as the Commission have been flooded with a series of admonitions, both through the press and through official channels, about the dangers of pressing forward with the CGF proposal. There have also been informal pressures, of an unacceptable kind, that the US would retaliate by cutting off EEC exports - which they are not entitled to do under GATT rules by unilateral action.

6. The arguments used by the US can broadly be summarized as follows:

   (a) the binding on CGF was negotiated in the Kennedy Round and resulted in corresponding US concessions;

(*) At the [illegible] meeting of the 113 Committee (Circulaires), Member States did not object to a Commission proposal asking for consultations with the US under GATT Art.XXII : 1 on the evolution of American CGF exports to the EC.

(b) breaching the GATT concession would set an undesirable precedent (soya in the pipeline?);

(c) trade restrictions on CGF would undermine the free trading system and result in a more generalized US/EEC trade war, so playing into the hands of those who seek to increase protectionism.

Commission's viewpoint

7. The Commission wants to reduce CGF imports:

Whether or not deliberately the US side continues to refer to a renegotiation of the duty on CGF and in some cases even to unbinding. This latter point is not correct. The Commission has asked for a mandate to negotiate a temporary modification of the binding which would be replaced by a tariff quota calculated on the basis of imports in 1981 (about 3 M tonnes) and for which the zero duty would continue to be applied. The compensation to be agreed mutually would be limited to any increase in exports above 3 M tonnes which the US could show would be denied to them by this temporary system.

8. The GATT binding is not negotiable:

This is not correct. Article XXVIII of the GATT is specifically designed to permit Contracting Parties to unbind or renegotiate concessions. As such it has been used in the past by both sides, and does not therefore create a precedent. By refusing to negotiate the US would deny us our GATT rights and would behave irresponsibly.

9. Action on CGF is a prelude to further proposals (soya):

In proposing action on brans, manioc and CGF the Commission has concluded its examination of the cereal substitutes problem which it undertook as part of the 'mandate' proposals submitted to the Council.

Other points

10. The Commission's proposals on cereal substitutes must be placed in the broader context of the Community's efforts to bring about a better balance in its cereals sector. The measures taken in parallel to realign EEC support prices with corresponding US prices are to the advantage of the overall export interests of the US.

ANNEX III

EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Divergencies of approach in East-West economic relations still exist between the US and the EC. This is due, on the one hand, to some difference of interests at stake, and to a different assessment of the appropriate policy measures to be taken vis-à-vis the USSR and the Eastern European countries on the other hand, although there is no basic difference in the analysis of the situation.

a) Different interests at stake

- The importance of the USSR and its allies in commercial terms is much greater for the EC than for the US. Moreover, the EC's trade with Eastern Europe, and especially the USSR, reveals a growing imbalance to our disadvantage. For several Member States, commercial relations with the USSR and other Eastern European states are so important that a radical change in policy would lead to considerable damage to their own economies.

- Also with regard to security of energy supplies the EC is in a much weaker situation than the US and the opportunity to buy Soviet natural gas in order to diversify our gas imports also caused tensions with the US. The Reagan administration is afraid that the EC would become too dependent on the USSR for its natural gas supplies, a factor which could weaken Western Europe's economic and political strength. In addition to the security of supply aspect, the EC has also a much bigger stake in cooperating with the USSR on the gas pipeline. Indeed, a natural gas deal with the USSR would also involve important sales from several EC Member States to the USSR for the construction and maintenance of this pipeline.
  Here the US would like to see the EC to be more cautious in terms of transfer of sensitive technology to Eastern Europe, a question which is only part of the more general US reluctance regarding transfer of technologies to the USSR and its allies.

b) Different assessment of measures to be taken against the USSR and Eastern Europe

- The US is impatient with Community reluctance to take firmer steps in commercial measures against the USSR, especially in the context of recent and current developments in Poland. The Community countries generally do not consider that economic pressures are likely to lead to any rapid change in the policies adopted by the USSR, and that on the contrary, miscalculated pressures may lead to a

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worsening of the situation. Although it was hoped for some time that the US had accepted the natural gas deal between several Western European countries and the USSR in exchange for a more restrictive credit policy of the West vis-à-vis the USSR and Eastern Europe, this hope was crashed by the 18 June 1982 decision of President Reagan to extend the December 1981 sanctions on the export of oil and gas equipment to the USSR through the adoption of new regulations to include equipment produced by subsidiaries of US companies abroad as well as equipment produced under licences issued by US companies. This decision which is in conflict with Versailles Summit declarations and which raises the question of extraterritorial applicability of US law, will undoubtedly add to existing tensions in other areas of US/EC relations, such as steel, agriculture and export credits.

- This divergence of views on what policy to develop vis-à-vis the USSR with regard to the Polish situation reflects a basic difference between the US and Western Europe in their approach to the USSR and its Eastern European allies. Although we share similar concerns, the EC countries are inclined to avoid any policy of increasing confrontation and stress the importance of trying to continue some form of dialogue or further detente with the East. The decision of the recent NATO Summit in Bonn reflects this concern of Western Europe. But the same Summit also confirmed the conclusions reached at the Versailles Summit with regard to East/West trade relations which opted for a cautious and diversified policy including :

  - the improvement of the international system for controlling exports of strategic goods to the USSR and Eastern Europe and national arrangements for the enforcement of security controls ;

  - the exchange of information within OECD on all aspects of economic, commercial and financial relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe ;

  - the necessity to observe great caution and sound economic principles in establishing financial relations with these countries including the need for commercial prudence in limiting export credits.

The conclusions reached at Versailles and Bonn represent a compromise which is unlikely to satisfy for long the American wish to see more active steps taken to restrict credit to the USSR.

ANNEX IV

DISC (Domestic International Sales Corporations)

This has been a contentious point between the US and the EC since the introduction of the DISC Legislation in 1972. The DISC Legislation concerns taxation facilities for profits drawn from export activities from the US territory. The Commission has always regarded these facilities as export subsidies, an opinion not shared by the US Administration.

The GATT Council adopted in December 1981 a report by an investigating panel "that the DISC Legislation in some cases had effects which were not in accordance with... Article XVI.4.".

On 29 April 1982 the Commission submitted to the GATT Secretariat a communication to the other contracting parties in which it explained that the EC requests the GATT Council to recommend, in conformity with Art. XXIII : 2 that the US rapidly take appropriate measures in order to make the DISC Legislation conform with GATT stipulations. It may be recalled here that also Canada requested on 3 March 1982 that the US promptly notify the DISC subsidy in accordance with Art. XVI : 1 of the GATT and pursuant to Article 7 (3) of the Subsidies Countervailing Committee Code. The Community supported the Canadian request.

ANNEX V

EXPORT CREDITS : CONSENSUS

Considerable differences of view remain between the EC and the US on this topic, with the US looking for higher market-related consensus rates, while the EC has attempted to limit any rise in rates, particularly for developing countries.

In view of amending the "consensus" reached within OECD in November 1981, Mr. Wallen, Chairman of the "consensus" group had made a compromise proposal in early May 1982.

The main provisions of the compromise proposal were an increase in minimum interest rates (1.25 % for relatively rich countries / category 1 / and around 0.5 % for intermediate countries /category 2 /. These increases would be combined with a reclassification of buying countries within the framework of the "consensus". This would lead i.a. to reclassifying the USSR, the GDR and Czechoslovakia into category 1 as well as to upgrading a number of NIC's into category 2. The reclassification of the USSR into category 1 of buying countries was suggested by the Community at the March Consensus meeting. The compromise also envisaged a change in the regime for low interest rate countries (Japan), a margin of 0.3 % to be applied to these countries' commercial lending rates of interest.

The Community had obtained extension of the deadline for accepting the Wallen proposal until June 15, 1982.

After careful study of the Wallen proposal, the Commission informed the Consensus group participants on June 15, that the Community cannot accept the Chairman's proposals but that the Community is ready to reopen negotiations as soon as possible to establish new terms for a modified arrangement. The Community will propose several amendments to the Chairman's proposals and thinks it advisable to negotiate them in Paris.

However, since the US (and Japan) have indicated that they cannot accept any major changes in the Wallen compromise, the Community decision could give rise to new tension in US/EC relations.

ANNEX V bis

EXPORT CREDITS

AIRCRAFT CASE

- On May 28, 1982 an American company, Commuter Aircraft Corporation (CAC) filed a CVD complaint with the DOC and the USTR against imports of a large turbo prop commuter aircraft (the ATR-42) to be produced by Aerospatiale/Aeritalia) a French/Italian consortium.

  The complaint alleges that subsidies are being given on the manufacture, production or exportation of commuter aircraft from France and Italy and that such imports are threatening to cause material injury to a US industry. The alleged subsidy takes the form of subsidized interest rates reportedly with 80-85 % guaranteed financing for 10 years at 10.4 % interest.
- The matter was submitted by the Commission to the 113 Committee meeting of 11 June 1982 which approved the Commission's legal arguments against this complaint.

  These arguments lead to the conclusion that there is no basis, in fact or in law, for the allegations concerning the existence or the amount of the subsidy, concerning injury, threat of injury or material retardation of the establishment of an industry. The complaint does not contain sufficient evidence of a "causal" link between the preferential financing and any injury.

- These arguments were transmitted to the US Authorities on 11 June 1982 and were also submitted to the US side during the GATT consultations in Geneva of 15 June.

- In the meantime, the US International Trade Commission has instituted a preliminary injury investigation. Hearing is scheduled for June 23.

Annex VI.A

Government Procurement Code

1. Points on US implementation

a) The US has excluded from their implementation of the agreement a number of non-warlike materials purchased by the Defense Department. Consultations under Art. VII.3 of the GATT have led to no result, but a solution may be found in the bilateral Memoranda of Understanding between US and Member States in the NATO context (although two Member States have still problems with this).

b) Certain aspects of US tendering procedures "negotiated competition" procedure, single tendering cases for suppliers of unique capability - may infringe obligations of the agreement. Discussion of this matter is continuing.

2. Buy-American Legislation at State Level

The Community is also concerned at the number of States introducing regulations to oblige their authorities to grant preferences to domestic suppliers. This type of regulation falls formally outside the Agreement, but contravenes "the spirit of the Agreement" and the Strauss/Davignon exchange of letters in which US Administration agreed to avoid extension of such practices.

3. US complaints against EC.

The US requested consultations under Art. VII.6 of GATT, on the EC practice of elimination of VAT in calculating whether or not contract is above or below the agreement threshold. The EC is trying to find some solution to this to avoid possible condemnation by a panel.

Implementation by Italy has been unsatisfactory (in the Commission view). Some improvement has occurred since January 1982 in increased publication of contract notices, but this remains the main weakness in the Community position and a letter on this subject has been sent by the Commission to the Italian authorities.

Annex VI B

Application of Community Law to Multinationals

There has appeared over this last year criticism in the U.S. of Commission proposals on company legislation in three areas -

1) the "Vredeling-Davignon" proposal for a directive on employee information and consultation procedures;

2) the draft proposal on the substantive law of groups of enterprises not yet considered by the Commission;

3) the seventh proposed company law directive, now at an advanced stage in the Council.

These criticisms have arisen from representative bodies such as U.S. Chambers of Commerce, in newspapers and in the U.S. Congress (bills presented in both Houses). Apart from some technical criticisms (see addendum) main points are

- that proposals such as these are the expression of a policy hostile to multinationals especially American companies;

- that the proposals involve claims to extra-territorial jurisdiction;

- that decisions of U.S. parent companies which might affect employees of Community subsidiaries must be negotiated in advance with labour representatives in Europe;

- that Community proposals are discussed and agreed in secrecy.

Replies to these criticisms can be formulated very briefly as follows.

Discrimination against multinationals : Multinationals are not subject to more onerous treatment than other companies. The creation of a common framework, far from being a disadvantage to multinationals, will help to guarantee the continued long-term development of their activities.

Extra-territorial jurisdiction : Great care has been taken to avoid legislative techniques that would involve extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction. Only subsidiaries established in the Community are subject to legal obligations. Turning to the draft ninth directive, companies from outside the EEC are affected by the text as it stands at present only when they take action within the internal decision-making structure of Community companies.

Consultation with Employees : It is proposed that where decisions are to be taken that directly affect the employees of Community subsidiaries, the management of those subsidiaries should inform the employees' representatives in advance; hear their views on the proposed changes; and, where requested in certain cases, discuss with them measures to be taken with regard to the employees. But there is no proposal for a requirement that employee representatives should give their consent either to the change itself or to the measures taken in relation to the employees.

The Commission considers it important that employees be informed and consulted about major changes that affect them. The period of economic difficulty in which we are living, requiring as it does the re-structuring of many industrial sectors, has underlined the need for systems designed to ensure that the social

consequences of change are well-managed and to improve the general level of understanding as regards changes that may well be disagreeable to many. At the same time, necessary structural changes must not be blocked and for this reason the Commission has always rejected the notion that such changes be subject in law or in fact to a right of veto by employees.

Secrecy of Community process : This criticism is without foundation. In a legislative process such as that of the Community, which is lengthy and open at all stages, there is simply no reason why a party affected by Commission proposals should not be aware of them.

A contributory factor in stirring up opposition is the potential impact of the Commission proposals on a small group of U.S. multinationals controlled by privately held corporations that fall outside the scope of U.S. securities and exchange regulations. Community company law will have an impact on their operations much more far-reaching than U.S. federal securities laws. In the field of group accounts for example, they will be treated in the same way as quoted companies and will thus be required to disclose information which they have traditionally kept to themselves on both sides of the Atlantic.

6. Energy Pricing Policies in USA

1. The basic economic philosophy of the U.S. Administration as regards energy pricing was illustrated most vividly by the immediate decontrol of oil prices as soon as President REAGAN took office. It is based on a commitment to unfettered market forces.

2. Unfortunately, President REAGAN also inherited, in the field of natural gas, an industry with a history of decades of regulation, legislation on gas price controls which was the compromise result of bitter Congressional battles prior to 1978, and a legislative system requiring Congressional approval for any change in this situation. Since 40 million American households fear a doubling of the prices they pay for gas in the event of decontrol, it is not surprising that the pressure on Congress to maintain controls should be strong. The farm lobby and some parts of industry are also opposed.

3. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to doubt the Administration's basic commitment to decontrol nor its view that the time has not yet been ripe to attempt to push decontrol legislation through Congress.

4. Commission pressure on the U.S. authorities on this subject has been expressed through three meetings of a U.S./EC petrochemicals study group (December 1980-June 1981), an exchange of letters THORN/BROCK at the end of 1981 and, most recently, a Note Verbale communicated to the U.S. authorities on 16 April.

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930

This section, entitled simply "unfair practices in import trade", covers a broad range of commercial practices from patent infringement to predatory pricing. Most cases have dealt with patent infringent.

While the Community can have no objection to the existence of a law whose effect should be the elimination of unfair practices, several features have been identified in the administration of Section 337 to which objection can be taken, or where improvement might be made. The provision is therefore regarded as a non-tariff barrier, and the Commission would wish to be able to enter into some form of bilateral discussion with a view to improving its operation.

Annex VI E

Tariff Reclassification

Following representations by U.S. firms to the customs authorities a number of instances have arisen where products have been reclassified for tariff purposes in a category where a higher - sometimes much higher-rate of duty is applied. The most important and far reaching case is that of certain traditional garments previously allowed to enter US in the non ornemental category now placed in the ornamented one (duty 35% or 42.5% ad. val. instead of 8%, or 37,5 ¢/lb + 21% ad val.). The form of this decision means that it could apply to a wide range of garments, with a very small degree of ornamentation. Clearly, the difference may be of great impact on price.

Other products involved in such decisions include (the list is not exhaustive) plastic garment identification tags, writing ink containers, synthetic crystal quartz, wide-angle bicycle reflectors, lasted leather footwear uppers, speedometers and odometers used as exercisers.

In fairness it must be pointed out that not all requests to customs are met. For example the case of "moonboots", which would have raised the duty on this footwear from 6% to 37.5% or 50%, was refused.

Annex VI F

Shipping

1. Competition policy

Both the U.S. and the Community are in process of overhauling their regulations for application of competition policy to shipping. There are however certain significant differences in the proposals, for example the EC rule would permit "closed" Conferences, the U.S. would only allow those open to all ship owners; shippers' councils are permitted in the EC proposal, not in the U.S. one. These differences could lead to a clash of laws which could make the actions of the shipping lines on each side illegal under the other's code. Discussions will take place on 28/29 June to start work towards finding a solution.

2. Code of conduct for Linder Conferences

The U.S. does not intend to apply this code. They transmitted on 1 May 1981 an aide-mémoire to Member States and the Commission referring to it and to the EC Regulation, inviting Member States to hold consultations with the U.S. and to delay ratification. The U.S. view is that ratification of the Code will flood the market in the North Atlantic with Third World shipping, and that ratification by Member States will exclude the U.S. lines from participation in European trade as not conforming to the Code. This will also be discussed in the meetings of 28/29 June.

3. The Jones Act

This act limits participation in coast wise trade of the U.S. to American flag vessels, literally that goods transferred between U.S. ports will be carried only in American ships. This has the effect for example that a container ship leaving Rotterdam, with goods consigned to the U.S. ports of New York and Galveston, must either discharge all its cargo in New York, to be transhipped by a U.S. vessel, or must travel to Galveston with the reduced - and therefore uneconomic - cargo.

This is clearly a serious barrier to this service trade, especially in view of the size and economic importance of the Community merchant fleet.

UNITARY TAXATION

This is a system of taxation applied by a number of States in the US (in particular California) in levying tax on corporations operating in their territories. It involves calculation of liability not by reference to their earnings in the territory ("direct method") but by reference to a fraction of total world earnings based on the proportion of the sales, payroll and property holdings in the state, to the world total ("indirect method"). This involves serious risks for double taxation. The OECD model convention for double taxation agreements admits the "indirect method" only under special circumstances which cannot be regarded as satisfied in the cases in question.

The Commission has, successfully, urged the US to intervene as "amicus curiae" in a case currently before the Supreme Court, in which the constitutional legality of the unitary taxation system is being challenged, opposing the system.

U.S. Copyright Act "Manufacturing Clause"

This problem, although less prominent and of rather less economic importance than the others included in this repertoire, is included because of its acute topicality.

The subject is Section 601 of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, which continues a provision, dating back to an enactment of 1981, which effectively prohibits import into U.S.A., of "non-dramatic literary works" in the English language by authors who are U.S. nationals, and which are manufactured outside the U.S.A. Certain exceptions are made, notably the first 2,000 copies of each work, and an exemption in favour of Canada. Introduced into the 1976 version of the clause is an automatic expiry date - 1st July 1982.

Congress has taken action in a bill introduced in July 1981 to prevent this automatic expiry. The Community in its turn has expressed its interest, insisting that the clause is contrary to GATT on two counts : first as a deliberate and arbitrary trade barrier, second in the discriminatory preference extended to Canada.

As it is now likely that the House of Representatives will adopt a Bill to extend the effect of the Clause, and as the Administration has (we understand) given its support, the Community has requested consultations on the subject under GATT Article 22.

U.S. Reciprocity Legislation

A dozen bills currently before Congress have been linked with the concept of reciprocity.

The motivations behind these bills were various. A general feeling of frustration at a perceived rise of protectionism in world markets was one, the desire to react against Japanese obstinacy in not dismantling non-tariff barriers more quickly was another, the desire to expand and open up world trade in services and high-technology goods and to dismantle foreign investment controls was a third.

The concept of reciprocity, as reflected in some of these bills, could have created severe problems. Being viewed in many cases as a concept applying to bilateral relations, it was at variance with the basic multilateral character of GATT and with its MFN principle, and the Commission pointed this out to the U.S. authorities in a Note Verbale on this subject transmitted on 22 March.

It is not yet clear whether any of the bills concerned will emerge from Congress in this session, and time is getting short. The bill which is furthest advanced is Senator Danforth's "Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act of 1982" which was reported by the Senate Finance Committee on June 17, to the Full Senate. In the House, the Florio Bill emerged from Sub-Committee on 16 June. As a result of Administration pressure and views expressed by the private sector, the formal reciprocity provisions of these bills have largely been dropped. Their general thrust is now to give the President a mandate to negotiate an opening-up of international trade in services and a removal of barriers to foreign investment, while strengthening his already existing powers to take retaliatory action against those countries maintaining unjustifiable or unreasonable restrictions (as a result of the denial of rights under international agreements or of national treatment).

Position of USTR

The latest version of the Danforth Bill has the implicit support of the Administration, and in particular of the USTR. It appears that USTR has been prepared to accept the retention of watered-down reciprocity provisions, which it originally did not want, in return for the Bill's provisions leaving the initiative in taking measures to the President (and thus to USTR).

THE COMMUNITY'S EXTERNAL TRADE : WORLD, U.S., CANADA, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, N.Z.

(Millions of Dollars)

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981(p)
Imports (cif)								
World (ex.EC)	156 008	155 660	178 174	197 608	227 165	298 968	378 082	339 000
U.S.	24 262	25 558	28 286	29 432	35 554	47 098	61 609	55 321
Canada	4 778	4 380	4 873	4 914	5 056	6 982	8 505	7 400
Japan	5 219	5 988	7 149	8 732	11 102	13 417	17 351	17 600
Australia	1 979	1 991	2 520	2 396	2 409	3 244	3 441	
New Zealand	1 022	841	935	1 030	1 240	1 464	1 518	
EFTA	24 403	25 119	27 817	31 995	41 847	56 036	68 059	
Exports (fob)								
World (ex.EC)	136 235	150 400	157 748	189 884	221 617	266 032	312 496	294 500
U.S.	18 977	16 380	18 149	23 429	29 432	34 321	36 989	41 137
Canada	3 020	3 167	3 100	3 489	4 058	4 599	4 718	5 100
Japan	3 303	2 763	3 040	3 524	4 748	6 346	6 362	6 300
Australia	2 893	2 642	2 689	3 049	3 610	4 036	4 288	
New Zealand	909	778	679	747	854	1 025	933	
EFTA	33 334	33 668	37 439	43 708	49 952	65 091	79 393	
Balance								
World (ex.EC)	- 19 773	- 5 260	- 20 425	- 7 724	- 5 548	- 32 936	-65 587	- 44 500
U.S.	- 5 285	- 9 179	- 10 137	- 6 003	- 6 122	- 12 777	-24 625	14 184
Canada	- 1 758	- 1 213	- 1 773	- 1 425	- 998	- 2 383	- 3 786	2 300
Japan	- 3 109	- 3 225	- 4 109	- 5 208	- 6 354	- 7 071	-10 989	11 300
Australia	915	651	169	653	1 201	792	+ 846	
New Zealand	- 32	- 63	- 256	- 283	- 386	- 439	585	
EFTA	8 931	8 549	9 622	11 713	8 105	9 055	11 334	

Source : Eurostat : Monthly Trade Bulletin
Special Number 1958- 1980 & N° 4 - 1982

(p) Figures contain estimates for UK.

ANNEX VI J

EC-US IMPORT-EXPORT TRADE : BY EC MEMBER STATE

(million dollars)

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
ts from USA (c.i.f.)								
rmany	5 396	5 788	6 971	6 922	8 197	10 431	13 509	12 064
ance	4 102	4 082	4 721	4 894	5 968	8 094	10.761	8 794
aly	3 132	3 361	3 430	3 283	3 817	5 278	6 679	6 195
therlands	2 959	3 474	3 627	3 890	4 555	5 661	6 747	6 264
lgium/Luxembourg	1 941	1 954	2 166	2 428	2 794	3 988	5 494	4 456
ited Kingdom	5 886	5 997	6 374	6 662	8 877	11 962	15 918	14 483
eland	247	272	358	381	534	722	874	1 086
nmark	601	630	637	760	812	961	1 273	1 520
(Greece)								457
tal	24 262	25 558	28 286	29 220	35 554	47 098	61 256	55 321
ts to USA (f.o.b.)								
rmany	6 696	5 349	5 722	7 842	10 013	11 332	11 651	11 565
ance	2 241	2 044	2 527	3 266	4 273	4 792	4 933	5 605
aly	2 311	2 283	2 403	3 002	3 990	4 662	3 822	5 155
therlands	1 307	965	1 139	1 497	1 657	1 785	1 859	2 238
lgium/Luxembourg	1 584	1 174	1 164	1 571	1 849	2 104	2 183	2 329
ited Kingdom	4 132	3 911	4 431	5 386	6 626	8 584	10 820	12 502
eland	256	195	231	273	350	350	446	490
nmark	451	459	531	582	674	712	787	878
(Greece)								325
tal	18 977	16 380	18 149	23 419	29 432	34 321	36 499	41 137
ce								
rmany	1 300	- 439	- 1 249	920	-1 816	901	- 1 858	- 499
ance	- 1 861	- 2 038	- 2 194	- 1 628	-1 695	- 3 302	- 5 828	-3 189
aly	- 821	- 1 078	- 1 027	- 281	- 173	- 616	- 2 857	-1 040
therlands	- 1 652	- 2 509	- 2 488	- 2 393	-2 898	- 3 876	- 4 888	-4 026
lgium/Luxembourg	- 357	- 780	- 1 002	- 857	- 945	- 1 884	- 3 311	-2 127
ited Kingdom	- 1 754	- 2 086	- 1 943	- 1 276	-2 251	- 3 378	- 5 099	- 1 981
eland	9	- 77	- 127	- 108	- 184	- 372	- 429	- 596
nmark	- 150	- 171	- 106	- 178	- 138	- 249	- 486	- 642
(Greece)								- 82
tal	- 5 285	- 9 179	-10 137	- 5 801	-6 122	- 12 776	-24 758	-14 184

ce: Eurostat: Monthly Trade Bulletin: Special Number 1958-1980 & N° 4 - 1982